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Mary Ellen Callahan
We have heard all morning about legal issues with the Internet
of Things; I want to begin with acknowledging the human aspects
and human interests in Internet-enabled homes, which are more
visceral and personal than IoT devices monitoring other
interactions. I have worked in privacy for almost 20 years, and I
passionately believe we need to think carefully about the privacy
implications that come with technology, especially when we are
dealing with the home.
The rapid increase of technology is re-defining our very
concept of “home,” and that raises several crucial questions:
1) what do we mean by “home,”
2) why do we expect more privacy in our homes, and
3) if that is a legitimate expectation under the current legal
doctrine, is that expectation sustainable – or even reasonable – in a
sensor-laden world where actions inside and outside the house are
documented, gauged and stored?
CURTILAGE OF THE HOME
More than 50 years ago, Justice Potter Stewart wrote that the
right to retreat into the home lies “at the very core” of the Fourth
Amendment protections from unreasonable searches and seizures.
But the concept of “home” extends beyond the walls of our houses
– there is an old common law and constitutional concept that
persons have a heightened sense of privacy in, and among the
“curtilage” of, one’s home, which is land attached to a house,
surrounding it to “form one enclosure with it.” The curtilage is the
area created by the actions the property owner to define a protected
space – even if outside the house. Think of raising fences and
walls, and creating a sense of privacy or intimacy. There is a four-
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factor test (under United States v. Dunn from 19871) that asks: (1)
how close the claimed curtilage is to the home; (2) whether the
area and the home share a common fence or barrier; (3) how the
residents use the area; and (4) what steps the resident took to
protect the area from observation by passersby.
The protection of curtilage in a Fourth Amendment analysis
has been reaffirmed in the 21st century, by Justice Scalia, who was
a champion of protecting the curtilage of the home; his Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence will be missed. In Florida v. Jardines2
in 2013, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that a trained
dog, sniffing for marijuana scent outside a home but inside the
fence, conducted an unauthorized search under the Fourth
Amendment, because it violated the curtilage of the home. The
fence and space defined by the homeowner were among the
calculations that Justice Scalia made.
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Mr. Jardines had a reasonable expectation of privacy at his
front door – but as many people in this audience know, the
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test has had its ups and downs
in appellate jurisprudence – a photograph from the air may not
trigger reasonable expectations of privacy, but an infrared scanner
to see the heat emissions within the house may.
In fact, in the 2001 Kyllo decision (involving infrared scanners
to see whether a homeowner was using marijuana grow lamps),
Justice Scalia posited that one of the questions the Court used to
determine whether the search was unreasonable was asking
whether the device the government used was generally available to
the public. When “the government uses a device that is not in
general public use . . . [then it is] unreasonable without a warrant.”
We would all agree that the devices the general public use
today are very different than they were 15 years ago when Justice
Scalia wrote those words. And, as technology has evolved over
that time, the amount of data collected using that technology has
increased exponentially. The Court will be hard-pressed to rely on
1
2

United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013).

OCT 2016]

Connected Homes

3

its “general-population-using-the-technology” test to determine
whether a search is unreasonable. As Chris Ayers pointed out, in
South Carolina, the AMI smart meters installed by the public
utility were able to identify individuals growing marijuana,
reporting them to the police. There was no Fourth Amendment
search or seizure because the investigation was not performed by
the government. As we will discuss later, these indirect disclosures
will increase with more private companies collecting more unique
and detailed data.
Furthermore, given all the sensors within the Internet of
Things-enabled technologies that are designed to collect, store and
transmit information, can we even have a reasonable expectation of
privacy? This is particularly true if the ubiquity of the use itself is
part of the reasonableness test. This tautological logic is
frustrating.
But then again, even if we do have a reasonable expectation of
privacy, with smart fridges and smart thermostats and other smarthome devices, we are inviting someone into the house – and they
never leave. In the seminal Fourth Amendment decision in Katz,
Justice Stewart wrote that the reasonable expectation of privacy
could extend to the inside of a public phone booth – but that was
because Charles Katz – who was using the phone booth to make
illegal bets all over the country – “knowingly [sought] to preserve
[his conversations] as private.”
Then again, who are we being secure from? The Fourth
Amendment – and government access to data – is an important
consideration, but the sharing between and among private
companies also must be contemplated.
Third Party Doctrine
As I mentioned earlier, an additional constitutional standard
could make protecting the curtilage increasingly difficult – the
third-party doctrine. The third-party doctrine is a Supreme Court
principle that holds that people who voluntarily give information to
third parties—such as banks, phone companies, Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) and e-mail servers—have “no reasonable
expectation of privacy.” Some legal theorists feel the third-party
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doctrine was wrongly decided in the previous century, forty years
ago in an analog world. That was back when you had to go to a
bank to open an account. When the only “third party” involved in
sharing photos with family and friends was a leather-bound album.
Not so today. Given how interconnected and electronic our
information and assets are today, there are few things – including
all the devices we talked about this morning – that would not have
some element of interaction with a third party.
Justice Sotomayor recognized this, in her 2012 concurrence in
United States v. Jones3, opining: that “[m]ore fundamentally, it
may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill-suited to the digital
age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane
tasks.”
These “mundane tasks” could include every aspect of home
living – reading, cooking, movement within a home, using
electricity throughout the home, and home security monitoring
with alarm systems, cameras and sensors. Ironically, taking steps
to increase our home and curtilage security may actually reduce
our legal protection, since most of us will have to use a third-party
system (like Sawyers Control Systems) to protect our homes. The
call to re-evaluate the third-party doctrine by Justice Sotomayor is
essential if we are to remain safe and secure – physically and under
the law – in our 21st century homes and our curtilage.
BIG DATA’S HOUSE
Part of the conundrum of the IoT Home is that much of the
activity that is being recorded, gathered and analyzed had
previously taken place, but they had not been previously analyzed.
Kids playing in the basement. Parents making dinner. Doing
laundry. Yardwork. Sleeping. All activities that have occurred
since homes were first built, but the data-ification of these
activities – and the crunching of that data, on the individual and
3

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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aggregate levels – has only just begun. Previously, a single day, or
event, would generally be fleeting, a passing moment that was not
memorialized, unless it was a special event. This obscurity made
us less aware of individual days, and more aware of unique events.
With connected homes and ubiquitous sensors, every day is
special, unique, categorized and memorialized. Professor Hartzog
used the phrase “fixation of a moment designed to be fleeting” in
another context – surveillance – but the concept is the same. These
snapshots of data are fixations on moments, on processes. The
ubiquity of these Internet-enabled devices (currently at 4.9 billion
devices and increasing to 25 billion by 2020, according to Gartner)
add layers of complexity and analysis on these mundane tasks
previously undocumented.
That analysis can be useful, effective, and improve not only the
lives within the connected home but also having a societal impact.
The sensors and the smart homes are looking for ways to save
money, looking for patterns and ways to improve your quality of
life along with non-obvious relationships.
When I was at the Department of Homeland Security, we spent
a lot of time looking for non-obvious relationships, patterns that
appeared through the analysis of big data. Non-obvious
relationships do not always appear, and therefore the collection and
analysis of a great deal of information without demonstrating any
rewards can be ineffective if not analyzing the right data.
With that said, major benefits can be had from collecting and
crunching lots of data. But, with any collection of data, even the
seemingly benign, we have to ask questions that are usually a lot
trickier to answer than it seems: “Who else gets the data?” “Is the
data being shared with other parties?” You know you are sharing
data with a first third party, Company X, only for Intended Purpose
Y, but is that information being shared with Company Z, too? And
if that data is being shared with other parties, what rights do those
parties have to your individual and aggregated data?
Obviously, under the third-party doctrine, you no longer have a
reasonable expectation of privacy to your data that has been shared
with your first third party. However, you still have other
expectations about that data, including keeping it safe and secure,
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and using it only for the purposes intended. In this situation, the
third-party doctrine may say that you no longer have a privacy
interest in information about your own home, but human nature
and consumer expectations would differ.
Since the biggest threat to connected homes is the risk of
secondary or unknown uses, we as purchasers of the devices and
sensors need to understand what this all means for us and our
homes.
INTER-CONNECTED WORLDS
Sensors are useful, helpful, maybe even crucial, but they also
fundamentally shift how we interact with our surroundings. They
enter with little, if any, real notice and choice, and then blend into
the scenery: unobtrusive, silent and passive. Once they are woven
into the fabric of our lives and homes (and sometimes literally
woven into the fabric), it’s easy to forget they are there.
We must pay close attention to this issue, before we lose
control of our homes, hearts and welfare. We are monitoring,
gauging, storing and sharing data about personal activities and
processes; we are sharing elements of the curtilage with strangers
in the cloud, online and in social networks.
In this always-on world, the ecosystem is the crux, and the
weakest link in that ecosystem is the vulnerability. The
fragmentation in software ecosystems, and the need to have
multiple systems and software inter-connections, leads to
inconsistencies, vulnerabilities and opened networks, subject to
unauthorized access.
Transparency
Mary Culnan and Paula Bruening have outlined a detailed
theory on how transparency and choice can be effectuated in a
sensored world where the ability to convey appropriate notice may
be constrained.
But such transparency and choice are not required; it is only a
best practice, consistent with the fair information practice
principles (“FIPPs”) set forth by the Federal Trade Commission
and other enforcement agencies (as David Hoffman discussed
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earlier). In fact, in one of the few laws that govern the collection of
online personal information, under the California Online Privacy
Protection Act (CalOPPA), an “online service” only requires a
privacy policy for the collection of personal information, narrowly
defined to include name, address, and phone number among other
data elements. The sensors we are discussing today do not meet
these legislative definitions.
The devices we are considering today are not online services –
they’re not asking us to enter our social security numbers – they
are sensing, storing and collecting data without us lifting a finger.
We are considering devices for which passive data collection is
part of the appeal. And there is often no way to provide a checkbox
to require the consumer to click “agree” before the data starts to be
generated. As Paula Bruening discussed, moving to a transparency
regime is important. But it also may be difficult.
And that is part of the problem – smart homes and sensors are
not governed by legislation; they do not fall into the sectorial
approach to privacy that the U.S. has adopted. Instead, we are
relying on FIPPs and best practices and reasonable expectations.
These are all well-intended, but as discussed earlier with
reasonable expectations, the scale can shift, and furthermore we
have put a great burden on individual consumers to wade through
systems, programs and choices.
Choices
A reasonable expectation of privacy, coupled with notice from
the company and some “choice” associated with the data
collection, is consistent with industry best practices, and the FIPPs.
And even though there may be notice and choice in discrete
instances, that choice is often illusory – it is impossible to use
certain brands of connected televisions without agreeing to the
collection and use of browsing and viewing information for
targeted advertising, for example, and the choice is controlled at
the individual device level rather than holistically. Professor
Hartzog talked about focusing first on the technology, how it is
designed, how it is supposed to be sharing the information. I think
that is part of the process, but I think the portion of the IoT
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analysis that is under-emphasized is the interconnectivity between
the technologies and the choices.
The Online Trust Alliance has established Internet of Things
principles for companies developing IoT products. Among the
principles are allowing sharing only with opt in, and allowing
people to delete the collected information. The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) highlighted notice and choice, data security
and data minimization in its IoT guidance last year. These are
important principles, but I worry about overloading consumers
with choices for multiple devices (even at multiple points in time).
And as much as I like my job, most lawyers who write privacy
policies and consents for just-in-time notices are looking at this as
a compliance exercise, not an educational one.
The FTC recommends writing policies, notices and other
consumer-facing documents at the reading level of an eighth
grader. Who here has read a privacy policy recently? That must be
one heck of an 8th grade teacher; hats off to her or him.
The test I usually apply is: “Will my mother understand it?”
My mom is a great person, clearly, since she raised [my brother
Tom Callahan] and me as well as our five other siblings. She also
only has a high school degree, and is 82 years old. She can operate
her iPhone, and can do some stuff on her computer, but for
anything else, Tom’s business partner and our brother Pat has to
remote into her computer in order to accomplish what Mom is
trying to do. (That is a whole different type of connected home).
So using her as a baseline is helpful to think about whether
consumers are understanding the choices put in front of them.
One way choice can be provided is by these “just-in-time”
notices and choices. The notices appear at the time you want to
engage or data is going to be collected. It is one thing to provide
notice via a cell phone map or application, but how does just-intime notice work for sensors and other devices that are not directly
interacting with you but still collecting data? And, with the growth
of sensors and the ubiquity of the devices, providing any just-intime notices or choices could overwhelm a person.
Another deficiency in a choice model for IoT devices in that
choice is often thought of at the individual device level, when in
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reality, it is the interconnectivity and the entire system that should
be considered. These patchwork, fragmented software systems
impede our ability to make knowing choices.
Privacy by Design
Paula Bruening earlier discussed Privacy by Design. The
concept of Privacy by Design is an important element of the
development of any device, much less one that is connected to
your life, and your home. Privacy by Design is an approach that
takes privacy into account throughout the whole engineering and
lifecycle of a product. Privacy by Design can and should be
incorporated proactively into Internet-enabled devices. With that
said, the individual devices need to work together in an ecosystem
in order to provide effective Privacy by Design. Once the process
starts, including the addition of new devices and sensors,
consumers have no idea how they will connect and what data they
will share. The problem of the weakest link can undermine an
ecosystem of devices that individually incorporated Privacy by
Design, but did not consider the interconnections.
IOT SECURITY
Finally, I get to speak about the elephant in the room, or in the
IoT devices – security. There are two aspects of security that are
important for the connected home: 1) government access to IoT
data; and 2) inherent security flaws in the devices, or in the device
ecosystems that create vulnerabilities.
Government Access to Data
In addition to the struggle with connected devices and
understanding the choice paradigm, the security of the sensors and
their data – particularly those we use in the home – can raise
alarms. Networked sensors are willing mechanisms for
surveillance. That is what the devices are designed to do.
Recently, a policy debate has emerged about whether using
strong encryption for communications and data storage would
hinder important law enforcement investigations. The term used
most frequently among law enforcement is “going dark” – unable
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to see vital communications. The current debate between Apple
and the FBI with regard to the San Bernardino attacks has been
discussed at length this morning so I will not discuss it. With
regard to the question of whether the government is losing access
to certain information, there’s a whole other universe of data that is
not dark at all – IoT data. As Harvard’s Berkman Center’s
Cybersecurity Project recently pointed out, the Internet of Things
allows insights into aspects of society that previously were not ever
monitored or stored.
Just as we are creating and collecting exponentially more data
due to these connected devices, so too does the government have
the ability to gain legal access to that information. And of course,
under the third-party doctrine, individuals do not have a privacy
interest in that data they self-generated and volunteered to third
parties. The amount of data generated each day demonstrates that
law enforcement is not going dark, but instead shining a different
color light. As we collect, store and analyze information within our
home, we are undermining the protection of the curtilage, and
could be allowing law enforcement to gain access to our data – and
to look for obvious or non-obvious relationships in a way they
could not have absent the ubiquity of data collected in our homes.
Just last week, as part of his annual unclassified Worldwide
Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community testimony
before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Director of
National Intelligence James Clapper confirmed that the 15
intelligence agencies under his purview are increasingly looking to
Internet-enabled devices for surveillance opportunities. “In the
future, intelligence services might use the IoT for identification,
surveillance, monitoring, location tracking and targeting for
recruitment, or to gain access to networks or user credentials.”
The risk is real. The interest from law enforcement and
intelligence (and of course nefarious bad actors) is high.
And remember, one of the tests for reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment is whether the device the government used is
also used by the general public. The more devices we have
monitoring our actions, the narrower that test becomes.
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Security Flaws
We have already discussed the patchwork, fragmented software
systems. We often do not wholly understand what the devices are
doing, but we understand that we need to keep the ports open in
order to transmit the data. The security defaults on devices are
frequently lax, or designed for open communications.
Shodan, the self-styled “search engine for the Internet of
Things” is a stark example of how many Internet-enabled devices
are discoverable and searchable. That includes, by the way, traffic
lights and industrial control systems, along with webcams and
home routers.
Of course, Shodan now markets itself partly as a vehicle to
monitor network security, and to discover your own Internetenabled devices, but in reality, the search engine facilitates our
most prurient interests, allowing us to step past the curtilage of
other homes, as we sit in the relative security of our own.
Just as making choices at a granular level for each of the
connected devices blurs the overarching question about controlling
one’s own information, so too does relying on each connected
device to keep your information secure, and to keep the
connections between each device secure.
The impact of not having good security in a smart home could
mean the home itself turns against you. Ransomware – a hacker
taking control of a computer or Internet-enabled device, and
holding it hostage until you pay a ransom to unlock it – has been a
common problem over the past few years for personal computers
and other unprotected devices. There have been apocryphal stories
of hackers taking over your house via refrigerator. But that actually
may not be too farfetched. The security of a connected home is
only as secure as the weakest device, the device with the worst
security. As we add more sensors, devices and computers into our
homes, we introduce many more potential “weakest links.”
TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
What I worry about is that our homes may become an Internetenabled tragedy of the commons. As you all likely know, the
tragedy of the commons is a situation where individuals acting
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independently and rationally according to their own self-interest
behave contrary to the best interests of the whole by depleting
some common resource. We most frequently heard about this
principle in law school with sheep and cows grazing on common
lands in pre-Victorian England. But this principle may be ready for
a refresh.
It is strange to think of our homes as “common” territory, even
with the third-party doctrine. We keep our home safe and secure,
we lock it, we establish the curtilage that helps define the
boundaries of our home. How could this be a common area?
The commons that the devices are using (for their own self
interest) are our homes themselves. Yes, they use bandwidth and
they use electricity, but I am not talking about the physical drain
on your home. Instead, I am talking about how the devices, sensors
and computers documenting each of our movements, steps and
activities may actually be depleting the common resource – the
sanctity of our home itself.
The sensors we have installed are recording, documenting and
itemizing our lives.
But by doing so, we expose ourselves to third parties with
whom we have contracted (and thus diminish our privacy interest
in the information in the first place).
We expose ourselves to other third parties we don’t know
about, maybe there by invitation, and maybe there by deceit.
We expose ourselves by relying on the security of the devices,
and how they interconnect.
We expose ourselves because we may not be able to
comprehend the sheer amount of information coming from the
devices.
Our minds, and our homes, are the commons. We have finite
resources to understand, manage and take action, but we have
potentially infinite metrics to gauge.
How do we solve this? As Justice Sotomayor noted in U.S. v.
Jones4, allowing the third-party doctrine to continue in the 21st
4

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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century “is ill-suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a
great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the
course of carrying out mundane tasks.” A review and recalibration
of the third-party doctrine is an important step for protecting our
homes, and our curtilages, even as we collect and store more data
within the home.
With that said, although I mentioned legislation earlier, I do not
think it would be useful to create legislation to govern IoT.
Legislation is often reactive, and cannot anticipate all uses or
developments. And just thinking about Congress trying to define
IoT gives me a headache.
I think self-regulation can help to a certain extent. Companies
agreeing to baseline principles can be a good thing in this
environment, for the companies and consumers alike, and I think
having some agreed-upon baseline standards will be important for
the growth of the industry, and for the protection of our own
homes. As I stated earlier, the ecosystem is the crux, and the
weakest link in that ecosystem is the vulnerability.
We need to take steps to protect our curtilage – physical or
digital – from unwelcome observers. We can use systems and
software and end-to-end encryption to secure our home, but we
need to feel comfortable with these steps taken. Think about
security, consider end-to-end encryption and other active steps to
re-take our curtilage.
I started this talk asking why do we expect more privacy in our
homes, and is that expectation sustainable in a sensor-laden world.
The answer on why we expect more privacy in our homes – in
addition to the legal discussion – is an emotional one. Because it is
emotional, it also means that, regardless of legal jargon, the desire
to keep safe and secure in one’s home will continue, even in this
sensor-laden world. In fact, maybe because of the sensors, we will
work to protect our curtilage even more effectively. Think about
our connected homes as the lifecycle of not just data, but of living.

